Window Shopping and Reasons Indonesians Are Getting Harder to Convince

Tommy Kurniawan, a member of Commission XI of the Indonesian House of Representatives, called this phenomenon an "important alarm" for weakening purchasing power, linking it to BPS (Statistics Indonesia) data showing household consumption growth in the first quarter of 2025 reached only 4.87%, slower than the same period the previous year. Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Airlangga Hartarto, on the other hand, called it an "exaggerated issue," citing second-quarter 2025 economic growth of 5.12% and household consumption that, by his account, grew 4.97% in the same period. Both are correct according to the data, but each highlights a different slice of time.

What often gets missed is that the "crisis or not" debate had effectively already settled on the ground well before this article was written. Here's the timeline:

• July to August 2025: the terms Rojali and Rohana go viral, with the House and the Coordinating Ministry disputing their meaning.

• Late November 2025: the Indonesian Shopping Center Management Association (APPBI), Jakarta chapter, launches an official strategy called "Rojali Transformation 2.0, Turning Groups into Buyers," acknowledging the phenomenon is real and needs an operational response, not just rhetorical pushback.

• Early 2026: a follow-on phenomenon called Rocadoh (the "crowd looking for a match") emerges, referring to visitors who come to malls to join matchmaking programs like Cindomatch at Mall of Indonesia, spreading to Jakarta and Surabaya.

In other words, the retail industry has stopped arguing over whether this phenomenon exists and has started building business models around it. The more useful question for brands and policymakers today isn't "is Rojali real," but "where exactly is consumer money and trust moving, and what finally gets them to hit the buy button."

Amid the macro-level number debate, one product category has data that most clearly reveals the scale of Indonesia's informal market: used clothing.

Officially, BPS data records imports of used clothing and textiles under HS code 63090000 jumping from 12.9 tons (2023) to 3,865.4 tons (2024), then 1,243 tons in January to August 2025. This figure is already odd on its own. This category has been fully banned since Trade Ministry Regulation (Permendag) 40/2022, a ban reinforced again by Permendag 47/2025, which took full effect in early 2026. Banned goods shouldn't have any official import figures at all, let alone ones that keep rising year over year.

But it turns out this BPS figure is just the tip of the iceberg, and the sheer size of the unseen portion is itself the strongest evidence of how large actual demand for the preloved market in Indonesia really is. Research from the NEXT Indonesia Center found that over the last two decades (2005 to 2024), Indonesia's official customs records for this HS code total only USD 16.4 million cumulatively. Compare that with export data from trading-partner countries reflected in UN Comtrade, the UN's official database, which shows a figure of USD 607.4 million for the same goods heading to Indonesia. The gap is about 37 times over.

The most striking difference shows up in the countries of origin. Based on Indonesia's official data, the top ten origin countries are dominated by the UK, the United States, and Japan, a pattern consistent with personal relocation goods, as explained by the Trade Ministry. However, UN Comtrade data tells a different story. Malaysia, Singapore, and China are recorded as the largest exporters of used clothing to Indonesia, even though the three barely appear in BPS's official top ten. The largest trade route turns out to be the one least visible in official statistics, a pattern that, in international trade analysis, is often associated with invoice manipulation (misinvoicing) or unofficial entry channels. The data available in this research doesn't allow the author to pin down the specific cause, but the sheer size of the recording gap remains strong evidence that the real market is far bigger than what official statistics capture.

This explains why raids keep happening even though they've never truly stopped the supply. Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa has openly called used-clothing imports an illegal activity that harms the state, and the government has stepped up raids at various ports.

However, as long as the gap between official records and trade reality remains this large, enforcement at entry points alone won't be enough to stem demand that clearly exists. For readers who gauge purchasing power through the lens of official data, this is an important reminder: if a single product category alone can have a recording gap this large, it's not unlikely that similar patterns exist in other informal channels, such as livestream selling and social-media stalls, which notably carry no equivalent reporting obligation. How far this pattern extends into those channels certainly needs its own verification, but the finding in the used-clothing category is at least a signal that official data may be underestimating the scale of informal economic activity more broadly.

Beyond untracked trade routes, there's also a factor that's purely about lifestyle, and this is what will keep the preloved market from shrinking no matter how much raids intensify. Academic research by Iva Latifa (2025), titled "Exploring Interest in the Thrifting Trend Among Generation Z: An Analysis Using Max Weber's Theory of Social Action," on thrifting culture among Indonesian Gen Z shows the reasons go beyond price. Thrifting has become part of lifestyle and identity expression, with branded or vintage secondhand items seen as exclusive precisely because not many people own them.

Bank Indonesia's August 2025 Consumer Survey recorded the average propensity to consume at 74.8%, down from 75.4% the previous month. Meanwhile, the ratio of installment or debt payments to income actually rose to 11.4%, up from 10.9% the previous month. In other words, spending continues, but more of it is propped up by credit and buy-now-pay-later schemes rather than real income.

Official BPS data reinforces this picture from the GDP side. Annual household consumption growth has stayed below 5% since the third quarter of 2024, and touched 4.89% in the third quarter of 2025. That figure is the lowest level in 14 years, although BPS itself attributes the slowdown more to seasonal factors (fewer long holiday periods) than to structural weakening of purchasing power. Part of the root cause, according to Mandiri Institute research, is that real net income per worker fell from around Rp1.8 million in 2019 to Rp1.5 million in 2024. The World Bank recorded Indonesia's real wages falling by an average of 1.1% per year from 2018 to 2024. Income isn't keeping pace with the cost of living, so every rupiah has to be allocated more carefully.

Alvara Research Center's September 2025 research recorded that 49% of Indonesian household spending goes toward basic family needs. This figure is consistent with independent findings from Katadata Insight Center's second Katadata Indonesia Middle Class Insight (KIMCI) survey, which recorded 40.5% of middle-class monthly income allocated to daily consumption, with this high share explicitly read as an indication of financial pressure. A KedaiKOPI survey of 932 respondents in October 2025 adds to this picture: middle-class budgets are shifting toward basic needs and education, while fashion, dining out, and recreation are being cut or postponed.

The most interesting finding comes from Mandiri Institute data processed from BPS figures: Indonesia's middle class shrank from 47.9 million people (2024) to 46.7 million people (2025), the deepest decline since this method has been used. But look at where their money is still flowing. Non-food spending grew 6.4% (up from 3.2% the year before), driven by a surge in phone purchases (+31.2%) and electronics (+26.2%). Meanwhile, food consumption stayed nearly flat at 0.9%.

In other words, people are still spending on phone credit, gadgets, and transportation, while pulling back on food and lifestyle items considered less essential. This is a selective pattern that consumers themselves emphasize.

The part least discussed in the media is where the spending that "keeps going" is actually being financed from. Data from the Financial Services Authority (OJK) shows fintech lending growing 25% year over year, with outstanding value of Rp96.6 trillion as of December 2025. Pawnshop financing grew even more sharply, up 48% to reach Rp130 trillion in the same period. Unlike BI or Alvara data, which is based on perception surveys, this OJK figure comes from official transaction data, so it reflects funds that actually moved, not consumer attitudes or expectations.

BRI President Director Hery Gunardi, in his 2026 Economic Outlook presentation, divided mall visitors who "look like they're all shopping the same way" into at least three fundamentally different groups: an upper group that is genuinely financially able, a middle group relying on credit and buy-now-pay-later, and an "aspiring middle class" group whose consumption is rising even though their income hasn't. The three look identical on the mall floor, but rest on very different financial foundations. Significant consumer credit growth throughout 2025, paired with a rising non-performing loan (NPL) ratio for consumer credit in the third quarter, signals that some of this seemingly healthy consumption is actually financed by debt that's piling up.

This adds important context to the narrative that "spending keeps going." Consumption does continue, but for many people, that spending is propped up by short-term debt rather than income.

If people are holding back on spending at physical stores, where are they moving to? Official BPS data gives the clearest answer: online retail and marketplace transactions grew 7.55% quarter to quarter in the second quarter of 2025, the same figure Minister Airlangga himself cited as evidence that spending hasn't disappeared, just shifted channels. The head of BPS Madiun City, in a local analysis of Rojali and Rohana, noted the same pattern: prospective buyers compare prices and try on items in physical stores, then buy online because it's cheaper without the burden of store rental costs. A similar pattern, money moving to channels not always captured by official data, also shows up in the secondhand goods market discussed earlier in this article.

A part often missed in the "purchasing power is falling" narrative is that more cautious consumers also become more demanding consumers who need proof before buying. YouGov's research, "From Screen to Shelves: How Content Creators Are Driving Consumer Behaviour in the Makeup Industry" (late 2024 to early 2025, over 6,000 respondents across Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore), found that beauty product buyers in Indonesia have the highest level of trust in Southeast Asia toward user-generated content (UGC): 54% trust reviews from fellow users more than influencer content, and 60% cite honest reviews as the most convincing type of content, outranking expert advice, product demos, and official brand ads.

This pattern isn't limited to the beauty category. Populix research (2023) on 1,772 national respondents recorded 59% of Indonesians actively searching for product reviews before buying across categories, with testimonials from other buyers among the most sought-after types of information. This suggests the need for social proof cuts across sectors rather than being specific to one industry.

In other words, today's consumer hesitation centers on whether a brand has provided enough social proof to convince people that their money, which is increasingly limited, is worth spending there.

One nuance missing from most coverage of Rojali and Rohana: this phenomenon is likely felt far more strongly in Jakarta than in other cities. Sutandi Purnomosidi, head of APPBI's East Java chapter, explicitly called the phenomenon "Jakarta-registered" (using the analogy of a Jakarta ID card), noting that mall conditions in Surabaya remain relatively steady. The decline seen in Surabaya looks more like an ordinary seasonal cycle after Eid and school holidays, not a sign of structural weakening as reported from Jakarta.

This matters for the brands and policymakers reading this article. National macro data (BPS, BI, Mandiri Institute) describes a trend that's correct in aggregate, but the intensity of the "Rojali" phenomenon on the mall floor is likely uneven geographically. Channel and social-proof strategies effective in Jakarta may not be an equally urgent priority in second-tier cities.

Pulling all this data together, the picture becomes clear. Indonesian consumers haven't stopped spending. What's changed is the order of priorities (essentials first, lifestyle later), the source of funds (partly propped up by credit and buy-now-pay-later, not just income), the channel (partly shifted to marketplaces, the preloved market, and livestream selling), and the threshold of confidence needed before hitting the buy button (needing more social proof, not just discounts).

Rojali and Rohana aren't a sign that people have stopped being consumers. They're consumers doing research on the mall floor, comparing in-store prices with the marketplace on their phones, before deciding to buy elsewhere, or not buy at all.

This picture also keeps moving, rather than staying static. Bank Indonesia's Consumer Confidence Index strengthened to an optimistic level through late 2025 and early 2026, even recording a jump in discretionary spending during Ramadan and Eid 2026, with fashion growing 6.4%, beauty care 4.9%, and electronics 4.7%, quite different from the Ramadan 2025 pattern, which was dominated by daily necessities instead. However, this momentum didn't last. In May 2026, the Consumer Confidence Index fell again to 120.9 from 123.0 in April. The consumption-to-income ratio stayed relatively stable at 72.3%, only slightly changed from 72.1% the previous month. This pattern suggests the consumer recovery is seasonal and fragile, easily pushed up by moments like holiday bonuses, but quick to weaken again once that momentum passes.

Four implications flow from the data above.

First, on price: brands trying to compete on the cheapest price point will lose against the preloved market and imported thrift goods, whose prices are structurally lower. What can actually be won is an argument about durability and long-term use value, the kind of argument that makes people feel "expensive, but worth it" still makes sense even while reining in spending.

Second, now is the time to invest more seriously in authentic reviews rather than just endorsements, especially for categories with high purchase involvement like beauty, where trust in UGC in Indonesia has already proven to be the highest in Southeast Asia.

Third, the recommerce channel deserves to be treated as a new competitor. If fashion or lifestyle brands don't have an answer for the preloved market, whether through trade-in, buy-back, or a refurbished product line, budget-conscious customers will look for it elsewhere. The used-clothing recording gap discussed above is an indication that the actual size of this recommerce market is far larger than what shows up in official data, meaning the competitive threat is also bigger than brands usually assume.

Finally, there's a lesson to take directly from APPBI's own response. The "Rojali 2.0, Turning Groups into Buyers" strategy already launched by APPBI's Jakarta chapter offers a concrete model: malls and tenants are now building engagement through community and experience as the basis for long-term transactions, including tapping into new social trends like Rocadoh to draw in foot traffic that is then converted through event collaborations and food-and-beverage tenants, the category most resistant to the "just looking" excuse.

Sources

Survey or perception data

• Bank Indonesia, Consumer Survey, August 2025 and May 2026 editions

• Alvara Research Center, national survey, September 2025

• Katadata Insight Center, KIMCI survey, second edition (Q4 2025 to Q1 2026)

• KedaiKOPI, "Consumption Behavior and Purchasing Power of the Middle Class," October 2025

• YouGov, "From Screen to Shelves" (Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore), December 2024 to January 2025 (beauty category coverage, not general retail)

Administrative or transaction data

• Statistics Indonesia (BPS): GDP and quarterly household consumption growth data; online retail and marketplace transaction data, Q2 2025; used-clothing import data under HS code 63090000 (2016 to August 2025)

• Mandiri Institute (processing BPS/Susenas data), report "Dynamics of the Middle Class in 2025," February 2026

• Financial Services Authority (OJK), fintech lending and pawnshop financing data, December 2025

• World Bank, Indonesia real wage data, 2018 to 2024

Coverage and official statements

• Statements from House Commission XI, the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, and the Ministry of Trade regarding the Rojali and Rohana phenomena, July to August 2025

• APPBI Jakarta chapter, "Rojali Transformation 2.0, Turning Groups into Buyers" strategy, December 2025

• Coverage from Kontan, Kompas, Antara, Bisnis, Tempo, CNBC Indonesia, and The Conversation on the Rojali, Rohana, and Rocadoh phenomena, 2025 to 2026